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COLLECTIVE BARGAINING FOR
FARMWORKERS-SHOULD THERE BE
FEDERAL LEGISLATION?
Herman M. Levy*
I.

BACKGROUND

To avoid keeping the reader in suspense, the answer to
the question posed by the title of this article is provided prior
to any discussion. The answer is yes, there should be and
there is a need for federal legislation to provide collective bargaining for farmworkers. Whether such legislation can and
will be enacted poses a different question. The purpose of this
article is to provide some information relevant to the conclusion reached and to the available models for such federal
legislation.
Federal legislation providing collective bargaining for
farmworkers would serve a number of valid purposes. Such a
law would equalize the position of agricultural and industrial
workers and would provide uniform treatment of agricultural
workers. The law would not only permit employees' representatives to improve terms and conditions of employment by
means of the collective bargaining process, but would also enable representatives to help enforce existing federal and state
statutes and programs applicable to farmworkers. These statutes and programs have not been adequately enforced for the
benefit of the workers.
The plight and problems of farmworkers have received
attention in congressional hearings and from various commentators for many years." When Congress first considered the
* B.A., 1951, University of Pittsburgh; LL.B., 1954, Harvard University; Diploma
in Law, 1968, Oxford University; Professor of Law, University of Santa Clara.
1. Hearing on H.R. 881 (Title I), H.R. 4007, H.R. 4011, H.R. 4408, and H.R.
7513 Before the Subcomm. on Agricultural Labor of the Comm. on Education and
Labor, 93rd Cong., 1st Sess. (1973); Agricultural Labor-Management Relations:
Hearings on H.R. 5010 and Related Bills Before the Subcomm. on Agricultural Labor of the Comm. on Education and Labor, 92d Cong., 2d Seas. (1972); Seminar on
Farm Labor Problems, Hearingson H.R. 510 and Related Bills Before the Subcomm.
on Agricultural Labor of the Comm. on Education and Labor, 92d Cong., 1st Seas.
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question of collective bargaining for farmworkers and passed
the Wagner Act in 1935, the decision was made to exclude
farmworkers specifically from any coverage by the new law.2
The reasons for exclusion appear to have been chiefly political. Congressmen from industrial states sought to insure the
passage of the controversial Wagner Act by gaining the support of their colleagues from agricultural areas. The price for
this support was the exclusion of agriculture from collective
bargaining.' This reason, while understandable, was clearly
unfair to farmworkers then, and the continued exclusion remains equally unjust now. Another reason for the Wagner Act
exclusion may have been that it was thought to be administratively unfeasible to apply collective bargaining to agriculture.
Whatever validity this contention may have had, it is certainly undermined by the fact that one state, California, has
provided bargaining for farmworkers in comprehensive labor
legislation without any subsequent evidence that this legislation was impossible to administer or was destructive to the
agricultural industry.'
Whatever reasons for exclusion may have been articulated earlier, on balance, these reasons are far outweighed by
the benefits to be derived from the passage of federal legislation providing collective bargaining for farmworkers. The history of improved terms and conditions of employment for
workers in industries covered by the National Labor Relations
Act should provide encouraging evidence that federal legislation for farmworkers would result in similar gains for them.
Federal legislation would insure that the rights of farmworkers as well as the rights of employers and unions would
(1971); Migrant and Seasonal Farmworker Powerlessness,Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Migratory Labor of the Senate Comm. on Labor and Public Welfare, 91st
Cong., 1st & 2d Sess. (1969-70); Chase, The Migrant Farmworker in Colorado-The
Life and the Law, 40 U. COLO. L. REv. 45 (1967); Morris, Agricultural Labor and
National Labor Legislation, 54 CALIF. L. Rav. 1939 (1966); Note, The Farmworker:
His Need for Legislation, 22 ME. L. REv. 213 (1970); Legal Problems of Agricultural
Labor, 2 U. CAL. D. L. Rzv. 1 (1970).
2. Section 2(3) of the National Labor Relations Act of 1935 (29 U.S.C. § 152(3))
provides:
The term "employee"... shall not include any individual employed as
an agricultural laborer.
3. Morris, Agricultural Labor and National Labor Legislation, 54 CALIF. L.
REv. 1939, 1951-56 (1966).
4. California has had an agricultural labor relations law since August 1975 (CAL.
LAB.

CODE

§§ 1140-1166.3 (West Supp. 1980)).
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be uniform, rather than depending on various state laws or
the lack of any specific state legislation. If no federal law is
enacted, it may mean that farmworkers in major agricultural
areas will continue to be denied the benefits which workers in
other industries have enjoyed for many years.
II.

THE MODELS FOR FEDERAL LEGISLATION

A proposal to have federal legislation provide collective
bargaining for farmworkers is not new. A plethora of bills providing for collective bargaining or affecting agricultural labor
relations have been introduced in the past fifteen years. 5 A
review of the bills introduced during the 92d Congress (197172) reveals a general pattern. Thus, of the seven bills introduced, four (H.R. 1410, 5010, 10445, 3625) would provide a
comprehensive framework for labor relations by simply
amending the exclusionary definition of employee in section
2(3) of the National Labor Relations Act and thus vesting the
NLRB with jurisdiction over farmworkers. Except for H.R.
3625, these bills envision that the NLRB would cover all agricultural employees, apparently permitting the NLRB to apply
interpretations of the law applicable to other industries and
develop new interpretations specifically directed to agriculture. H.R. 3625, although providing that the NLRB would
5. The list includes bills proposing a comprehensive labor relations system for
agriculture, as well as other bills merely affecting some aspect of agricultural labor
relations. H.R. 3342, 96th Cong., 2d Seas. (1980); S. 285 94th Cong., 1st Seas. (1975);
H.R. 15104, 94th Cong., 2d Seas. (1976); H.R. 11635, 94th Cong., 2d Seas. (1976); H.R.
5521, 94th Cong., 1st Seas. (1975); H.R. 4786, 94th Cong., 1st Seas. (1975); H.R. 4408,
94th Cong., 1st Seas. (1975); H.R. 4179, 94th Cong., 1st Seas. (1975); H.R. 3256, 94th
Cong., 1st Seas. (1975); S. 3409, 93d Cong., 2d Seas. (1974); H.R. 9582, 93d Cong., 1st
Seas. (1973); H.R. 8100, 93d Cong., 1st Seas. (1973); H.R. 7513, 93d Cong., 1st Seas.
(1973); H.R. 4408, 93d Cong., 1st Seas. (1973); H.R. 4304, 93d Cong., 1st Seas. (1973);
H.R. 4011, 93d Cong., 1st Seas. (1973);'H.R. 4007, 93d Cong., 1st Seas. (1973); H.R.
3862, 93d Cong., 1st Seas. (1973); H.R. 881, 93d Cong., 1st Seas. (1973); H.R. 15885,
92d Cong., 2d Seas. (1972); H.R. 13981, 92d Cong., 2d Seas. (1972); H.R. 10459, 92d
Cong., 1st Seas. (1971); H.R. 10445, 92d Cong., 1st Seas. (1971); H.R. 5010, 92d Cong.,
1st Seas. (1971);H.R. 4438, 92d Cong., 1st Seas. (1971); H.R. 3625, 92d Cong., 1st Sess.
(1971); H.R. 3571, 92d Cong., 1st Seas. (1971); H.R. 2546, 92d Cong., 1st Seas. (1971);
H.R. 1689, 92d Cong., 1st Seas. (1971); H.R. 1523, 92d Cong., 1st Seas. (1971); H.R.
1410, 92d Cong., 1st Seas. (1971); S. 8, 90th Cong., 1st Seas. (1967); H.R. 16014, 90th
Cong., 2d Seas. (1968); H.R. 12953, 90th Cong., 1st Seas. (1967); H.R. 11684, 90th
Cong., 1st Seas. (1967); H.R. 11543, 90th Cong., 1st Seas. (1967); H.R. 6928, 90th
Cong., 1st Seas. (1967); H.R. 6343, 90th Cong., 1st Seas. (1967); H.R. 5594, 90th Cong.,
1st Seas. (1967); H.R. 4769, 90th Cong., 1st Seas. (1967); S. 1866, 89th Cong., 1st Seas.
(1965).
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have jurisdiction over farmworkers, would cover only agricultural workers employed by an employer who employed more
than 12 workers and had labor costs of $10,000 or more.
The other three bills (H.R. 1689, 10459, 13981) introduced in the 92d Congress would have established a comprehensive system under newly created agencies separate from
the NLRB. All three bills provided coverage for employees of
an employer in agriculture affecting commerce who used more
than 500 man days of agricultural labor during any calendar
quarter in the preceding calendar year.' H.R. 1689 would have
created a separate agency with some functional ties with the
U.S. Department of Agriculture.'
Certainly in exploring any future legislative models for
agricultural labor, serious consideration must be given to the
simple amendment of the NLRA and the vesting of the
NLRB with jurisdiction. This approach has merit in that it
employs a fully established agency with over 45 years of experience in labor management relations and makes it available
to oversee agricultural labor relations. This means that the
present NLRA with the shortcomings sought to be corrected
by the Labor Reform Act of 1977 would apply to agriculture
in the same way as to other industries.8 Some argue that it is
far better to have one uniform federal law for agricultural labor relations, even though not perfect, than to have uncontrolled regulation or varied controls under the laws of individual states. Many commentators who have considered the
application of the NLRA to agriculture think the NLRB could
handle this new area with little difficulty.'
6.

H.R. 1689, 92d Cong., lst Seas. (1971); H.R. 10459, 92d Cong., 1st Sess.

(1971); H.R. 13981, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. (1972). This coverage test is the one set forth
in the Fair Labor Standards Act.
7. H.R. 1689, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. (1971).
8. See Labor Reform Act of 1977, Part I: Hearings on H.R. 8410 Before the
Subcomm. on Labor-Management Relations of the Comm. on Education and Labor,
95th Cong., 1st Sess. 3-28 (1977).
9. Lewin, "Representatives of Their Own Choosing:" PracticalConsiderations
in the Selection of Bargaining Representativesfor Seasonal Farmworkers,64 CALIF.

L. REv. 732 (1976); Moberly, Collective BargainingLaws and Agricultural Employees: Some Necessary Changes, 1 U. IND. L.F. 469 (1976); Murphy, An End to American "Serfdom"-The Need for Farm Labor Legislation, 25 LABOR L.J. 85-93, 241-44

(1974); Triggs, A Rebuttal to Murphy; 25 LAB. L.J. 241 (1974); Hearings on S.8, S.
195, S. 197, and S. 198 Before the Subcomm. on Migratory Labor and Public Wel-

fare, 90th Cong., 1st Seas. 175 (1967) (statement of Ogden Fields, NLRB Executive
Director).
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Advocates of legislation providing for a separate agency
to control agricultural labor might feel that agricultural labor
relations are so unique that the interest involved would be
better served by a separate agency with a new law focused
solely on agricultural problems. The cost of such an approach
in the near future, however, would deter support from an
economy-minded Congress. Perhaps a reasonable compromise,
if feasible, would be to vest the NLRB with jurisdiction over
farmworkers and include in such legislation new provisions
specifically applicable to agriculture.10 It is important to remember that past proposals to amend the exclusionary provision of the NLRA and to place farmworkers under the jurisdiction of the NLRB were made at a time when there had
been no actual experience with labor legislation applicable to
farmworkers. Hence, no specific guidelines were available to
supplement the existing legislation with provisions directly related to agriculture. Now, however, there is some state legislation, including California's labor relations law, based on the
NLRA. Models for new provisions pertaining to agricultural
labor relations could be devised by studying state laws such as
the California Agricultural Relations Act, the most comprehensive of the current state laws. Analysts could then determine how well these state provisions have worked.
Another suggestion for agriculture is federal legislation
which would provide minimum federal standards for agricultural labor relations and would permit the states the option of
enacting legislation in this field. If a state failed to act, the
federal legislation would control. Such an idea has been provided by the Occupational Safety and Health Act. 1 More recently, a bill proposing to regulate public employees in state
and local government'2 included this minimum standards concept. The difficulties experienced under OSHA with this minimum standards idea and the long time it has taken to implement the plan, however, suggest that this model is neither
realistic nor viable.
10. See National Labor Relations Act of 1935, § 8(g), 29 U.S.C. § 158(g) (1976).
11. Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970, 29 U.S.C. § 667 (1976).
12. See S. 647, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1973); H.R. 4293, 93d Cong., 1st Sess.
(1973).
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III.

THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS ACT AND THE
CALIFORNIA AGRICULTURAL LABOR RELATIONS ACT

In exploring provisions which could be included in new
federal legislation providing collective bargaining for farmworkers, a comparison should be made between the National
Labor Relations Act (NLRA)l s and the California Agricultural
Labor Relations Act (ALRA).14 The ALRA is basically a reenactment of the NLRA with some new or different provisions
marking certain policy decisions made by the California legislature with respect to agricultural labor relations. The policies
and the implementation of these provisions by the ALRB
should be reviewed to determine the merits of including such
provisions in any new federal legislation.15 It is also important
to observe and evaluate how the ALRA has dealt with issues
common to both statutes, and how the nature of the agricultural industry has dictated variation in analysis and
conclusions.
Since the ALRB is patterned after the NLRB, it is not
surprising to find that many of its unfair labor practice decisions are consistent with NLRB decisions in similar situations. Indeed, the ALRA mandates that "the Agricultural Labor Relations Board shall follow applicable precedents of the
National Labor Relations Act, as amended," ' and many
ALRB opinions cite for support of their conclusions past
NLRB decisions raising similar issues.
Many of the major differences between the two statutes
occur in provisions relating to the ALRB's responsibility to
conduct representation elections. The NLRA provides the
Board with considerable discretion in determining the appropriate unit in which to conduct an election. It also authorizes
a pre-election hearing to resolve the unit question and other
representation matters. 17 If the hearings are contested, a num13. National Labor Relations Act of 1935, 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-169 (1976).
14. CAL. LAB. CODE §§ 1140-1166.3 (West Supp. 1980).
15. See Grodin, CaliforniaAgriculturalLabor Act; Early Experience, 15 INDUS.
REL. 275 (1976); Levy, The AgriculturalLabor Relations Act of 1975-La Esperanza
de CaliforniaparaEl Futuro, 15 SANTA CLARA LAW. 783 (1975); Segur & Fuller, California's Farm Labor Relations: An Analysis of the Initial Results, 99 MONTHLY LAB.
REV. 25 (1976); Comment, California'sAttempt to End Farmworker Voicelessness: A
Survey of the Agricultural Labor Relations Act of 1975, 7 PAC. L.J. 197 (1976).

16. CAL. LAB. CODE § 1148 (West Supp. 1980).
17. National Labor Relations Act of 1935, § 9(c)(1)(A), 29 U.S.C. § 159(c)(1)(A)

(1976).
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ber of months can elapse from the filing of a petition requesting an election until the actual date of the election. Board law,
however, does not mandate the election process as the sole
means for a labor organization to establish its majority status
and function as a bargaining agent. Employers are permitted
to grant recognition based on a majority showing by valid
union authorization cards signed by employees in the appropriate unit.'
In contrast, the ALRA provides practically no discretion
to the Board in determining the appropriate unit." This statute states that the bargaining unit in which to conduct an
election shall be "all the agricultural employees of an employer."20 This provision eliminates in part the necessity of
holding a pre-election hearing to determine the unit. The
question of unit or other representation issues can be heard in
a post-election hearing. The election itself is held within seven
days of the filing of a petition accompanied by authorization
cards signed by a majority of employees. Among other matters, the petition must allege that the number of employees is
not less than 50% of employer's peak agricultural employment for the year.2 ' The ALRA procedure thus allows for a
speedy secret ballot election and permits many seasonal employees to participate who otherwise would be excluded by the
present NLRA electoral system. The ALRA provides the election process as the sole means for a union to be certified as
bargaining representative and, by an unfair labor section,
makes it an unfair labor practice for an employer to recognize
a union not certified according to the ALRA. 21 The Board has,
however, recently ordered an employer to bargain with a
union where the union had lost an election preceded by nu18. See, e.g., NLRB v. Transport, Inc. of S.D., 453 F.2d 193 (8th Cir. 1971).
19.

The Agricultural Labor Relations Act of 1975 (CAL. LAB. CODE § 1156.2

(West Supp. 1981)) does provide some discretion with respect to unit determinations
where the agricultural employees of the employer are employed in two or more noncontiguous geographical areas. In these situations, the board determines the appropriate unit or units of employees in which the election shall be conducted.
The Board is developing guidelines to determine whether there should be separate units or a single larger unit in such situations. See Napa Valley Vineyards, 3
A.L.R.B. No. 22 (1977); Bruce Church, Inc., 2 A.L.R.B. No. 38 (1976); Egger & Ghio
Co., 1 A.L.R.B. No. 17 (1975).
20. CAL. LAB. CODE § 1156.2 (West Supp. 1981).
21.
22.

CAL. LAB.
CAL. LAB.

CODE
CODE

§ 1156.3(a)(1) (West Supp. 1981).
§ 1153(f) (West Supp. 1981).
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merous employer's unfair labor practices.' s The Board concluded, after analyzing its statutory powers and limitations,
that where employer unfair labor practices make unlikely the
possibility of a fair election, it may rely on employee authorization cards and order the employer to bargain with the union
as a remedial solution. This remedy is consistent with current
NLRB practice following the United States Supreme Court's
decision in NLRB v. Gissel Packing Company.'
The ALRA contains a significant remedial innovation.
The NLRB decided that it was not authorized by law to provide a "make whole" remedy where the employer had refused
to bargain, in violation of the Act, and employees had been
deprived of any collective bargaining agreement during the
time the employer was contesting the violation through the
administrative and legal systems. The NLRB felt it lacked the
statutory authority even if the employer was purposely utilizing the administrative and legal procedure to postpone the execution of a collective bargaining agreement.' The ALRA, on
the other hand, specifically permits the use of the make whole
remedy when the Board deems such relief appropriate to compensate employees for losses sustained because of the employer's refusal to bargain.26 The ALRB had applied this remedy to all cases involving an employer's refusal to bargain
according to a formula devised in its first interpretation of
this section of the statute. 27 The ALRB's broad interpretation
of its make whole remedy was recently reviewed and limited
by the California Supreme Court. The court concluded that
the make whole remedy was not appropriate in all situations
in which the ALRB had found that the employer had refused
to bargain. It further recommended that the ALRB should
carefully scrutinize the refusal to bargain cases before applying the make whole remedy.'6
23.

See Harry Carian Sales, 6 A.L.R.B. No. 55 (1980).

24. 395 U.S. 575 (1969).
25. Ex-Cell-O Corp., 185 N.L.R.B. 107 (1970), rev'd sub nom. Auto Workers v.
NLRB, 449 F.2d 1046 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
26. CAL. LAB. CODE § 1160.3 (West Supp. 1981).
27. Perry Farms, 4 A.L.R.B. No. 25 (1978); Adam Dairy, 4 A.L.R.B. No. 24
(1978); Yates, The "Make Whole" Remedy for Employer Refusal to Bargain:Early

Experience Under the CaliforniaAgricultural Labor Relations Act, 29 LAB. L.J. 666
(1978); Comment, The Make Whole Remedy: California'sAgricultural Labor Relations Board Deals with Refusals to Bargain, 19 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 1093 (1979).
28. J.R. Norton Co. v. ALRB, 26 Cal. 3d 1, 603 P.2d 1306, 160 Cal. Rptr. 710
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The ALRA also differs from the NLRA in sections dealing with secondary boycott and hot cargo. The ALRA permits
a certified bargaining representative who has not concluded a
collective bargaining agreement with the agricultural employer to exert pressure against neutral employers in situations which would give rise to unfair labor practices under the
NLRA.2 9 These ALRA sections are viewed as giving unions
additional bargaining tools at a time when these unions are
not as powerful as their industrial counterparts under the
NLRA.
There are also differences in union security provisions.
ALRA appears to sanction union requests for discharge pursuant to a union security agreement for reasons other than an
employee's failure to tender periodic dues or initiation fees.30
Few cases have yet been heard by the ALRB, so the range of
permissible reasons for discharge has not yet been established." The California legislature, however, has unsuccessfully sought in two sessions to amend this section of the
ALRA to conform it to the NLRA 82 The right to execute
union security agreements a short time after the employment
of the worker (in California the time period is five days) has
been viewed as extremely important to agricultural unions.
Without this right it might be difficult to collect dues from
seasonal workers who have received the benefits of the union's
collective bargaining but have moved on to other farms.
The ALRA varies the NLRA procedure for court review
by placing initial responsibility on the party affected by the
Board's order to petition the court of appeal for review within
30 days of the Board's decision. If no review is sought, the
(1979); See J.R. Norton, 6 A.L.R.B. No. 26 (1980) for the ALRB's current policy with
respect to application of the make-whole remedy. The Board noted in this case that
in determining whether the make-whole remedy is appropriate in technical refusal to
bargain cases, it would consider whether the employer's litigation position was reasonable at the time of the refusal to bargain, and whether the employer acted in good
faith.
29. National Labor Relations Act of 1935, § 8(b)(4), (e), 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(4),
(e); CAL.

30.

LAB. CODE

§§ 1154(d), 1154.5 (West Supp. 1981).

Compare National Labor Relations Act of 1935, § 8(a)(3), 29 U.S.C.

158(a)(3) with CAL. LAB.

CODE

§ 1153(c) (West Supp. 1980).

§

31. See Conchola, 6 A.L.R.B. No. 16 (1980) where the ALRB held that pursuant
to a union security agreement, employees could not be compelled to contribute, as a
condition of employment, to political or ideological union expenditures unrelated to
collective bargaining.
32. Governor Brown vetoed the bills passed by the legislature in 1979 and 1980.
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Board may petition the superior court for enforcement of its
decision and order. The court is then limited to reviewing
whether the order was issued according to established Board
3
procedures, and may not consider the merits of the case."
and speedy
The ALRB procedure is seen as more efficient
34
than the current processing of NLRB cases.

Application of the ALRA has created some issues which
have parallels under the NLRA and others which are original
to the farm labor statute. For example, the ALRB has dealt
with the question of who is a "successor" with respect to collective bargaining obligations and unfair labor practices when
a farm is sold. The NLRB has faced similar questions,"' but
some of the factors especially relevant to its conclusions, such
as the continuity of the workforce, had to be viewed and balanced in a different way because of the distinctive nature of
the agricultural industry.86
Then too, both Boards have faced questions of who is an
employer within the meaning of the statutes. The presence of
persons on the agricultural scene in addition to the owner of
the land, such as labor contractors, custom harvesters and
others involved in agricultural production, has created unique
for the ALRB to resolve in deciding who is
factual problems
37
the employer.
The ALRA requires that a representation petition must
allege among other things that the number of agricultural employees currently employed by the named employer, as determined from his payroll immediately preceding the filing of the
petition, is not less than 50% of his peak agricultural employ33. See National Labor Relations Act of 1935, § 10(e), (f), 29 U.S.C. § 160(e),
(f); CAL. LAB. CODE § 1160.8 (West Supp. 1981).

34. The California Supreme Court has approved the review of ALRB decisions
by the courts of appeal as provided in the statute. See Tex-Cal Land Management v.
ALRB, 24 Cal. 3d 335, 595 P.2d 579, 156 Cal. Rptr. 1 (1979). No case has arisen thus
far testing the statutory authority given the superior courts for limited review and
enforcement of board orders.
35. NLRB v. Burns Int'l Security Servs., 406 U.S. 272 (1972); Howard Johnson
v. Detroit Joint Bd., 417 U.S. 249 (1974); Golden State Bottling Co. v. NLRB, 414
U.S. 168 (1973).
36. Highland Ranch & San Clements Ranch, 5 A.L.R.B. No. 54 (1979); Rivcom
Corp. and Riverbend Farms, 5 A.L.R.B. No. 55 (1979).
37. Kotchevar Bros., 2 A.L.R.B. No. 45 (1976); Cardinal Distrib. Co., 3 A.L.R.B.
No. 23 (1977); Freshpict Foods Inc. & Nicholas Land and Leasing Co., 4 A.L.R.B. No.
4 (1978); Gourmet Harvesting and Packing, 4 A.L.R.B. No. 14 (1978); Garin Co., 5
A.L.R.B. No. 4 (1978).
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ment for the current calendar year.38 The question of the
meaning of "peak employment" and the timeliness of the petition has no exact equivalent under the NLRA. The ALRB in
a series of cases has attempted to develop reasonable guidelines to establish peak employment in a variety of different
situations and to make sure that the intended electorate is
permitted to participate fully in elections.2
During the time the ALRB has been interpreting and applying the statute, there have been numerous legislative proposals to amend the existing law. In 1979 there were more
than twenty bills introduced in the legislature, none of which
were enacted. Most bills were designed to curtail the authority
given the Board by the ALRA or to limit certain union or employee rights under the law. For example, there were proposals to eliminate the make-whole remedy, change the union security provisions, limit strikes, change the definition of
employer, provide remedies outside the ALRA, and change
provisions relating to contract bar and decertification.' 0 There
was also a proposal which would have permitted the Board to
issue bargaining orders in a Gissel type situation, a power not
specifically provided in the Act. 1
In 1980 a bill was introduced in the Assembly ' 2 designed
to repeal the ALRA. In its stead the bill seeks to enact the
38. CAL. LAB. CODE § 1156.3(c) (West Supp. 1981).
39. Mario Saikhon, 2 A.L.R.B. No. 2 (1976); Luis A. Scattini & Sons, 2 A.L.R.B.
No. 43 (1976); High & Mighty Farms, 3 A.L.R.B. No. 88 (1977); Donley Farms, Inc., 4
A.L.R.B. No. 66 (1978); Bonita Packing Co., 4 A.L.R.B. No. 96 (1978); Jack Brothers
& McBurney, Inc., 4 A.L.R.B. No. 97 (1978); Charles Malovich, 5 A.L.R.B. No. 33
(1979); Domingo Farms, 5 A.L.R.B. No. 35 (1979); Wine World, Inc., 5 A.L.R.B. No.
41 (1979).
40. S.B. 577, A.B. 840, A.B. 1675 (make-whole), CAL. LEGIS. 1979-1980 Reg.
Sess.; S.B. 504, A.B. 836 (union security), CAL. L.oIs. 1979-1980 Reg. Seass.; S.B. 1018
(limit strikes), CAL. LEGIS. 1979-1980 Reg. Sess.; A.B. 756 (definition of employer),
CAL. LEGIS. 1979-1980 Reg. Sess.; S.B. 238, A.B. 773, A.B. 839, A.B. 1011 (remedies),
CAL. LEGIS. 1979-1980 Reg. Sess.; A.B. 470, A.B. 838 (contract bar and decertification), CAL. LEGIS. 1979-1980 Reg. Sess..
The ALRB recently interpreted the contract bar rule (CAL. LAB. CODE § 1156.7(c)
(West Supp. 1981)) as it applies to the timeliness of a decertification petition filed
during the first year of a one-year collective bargaining agreement. The Board's conclusion that a decertification petition could be timely filed at any time during the
twelve months following the 30th day prior to the contract's expiration date, M.
Cartan, Inc., 4 A.L.R.B. No. 68 (1978), was disapproved by the court of appeal as not
in conformity with the Board's statutory authority. See Cadiz v. ALRB, 92 Cal. App.
3d 365, 155 Cal. Rptr. 213 (1979).
41. A.B. 840, CAL. LEGIS. 1979-1980 Reg. Seass..
42. A.B. 3434, CAL. LEGIS. 1979-1980 Reg. Seass..
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NLRA stripped of any provisions specifically directed at the
peculiarities of the agricultural industry and supplemented by
some NLRA provisions which have doubtful applicability to
agriculture. See, for example, proposed section 1158(f) which
would enact the NLRA special construction industry exemption. The bill, however, varies the NLRA model by providing
for the enjoining of strikes or lockouts after a Governor's
board of inquiry has concluded that the strike or lockout imperils public safety or health. A careful examination of this
proposed law leads to the conclusion that it would provide a
more costly, less efficient, and more restrictive procedure for
California than the present law which was designed specifically to deal with agricultural labor relations.
Statutory language aside, there also appear to be some
differences in the focus of the two Boards in implementing the
purposes of the statutes. Thus, for example, in the representation area, the NLRB is most concerned in maintaining "laboratory conditions" when elections are conducted and ordering
bargaining or a new election if these conditions are destroyed.
The ALRB, on the other hand, is much more concerned with
creating a well-informed electorate that will be able to exercise a free and informed judgment in the election. The ALRB
has not been unconcerned about "laboratory conditions" and
election atmosphere, but it has felt that top priority should be
given to the dissemination of voter information. The ALRB
may be influenced in this decision by the fact that setting
aside agricultural elections might mean a rerun could not be
held for another year at the time of peak employment called
for by the statute. The ALRB in carrying out its goal of informing the electorate has promulgated rules and programs.
One rule sets forth the guidelines by which unions may gain
access to the employer's property to talk to employees."' Another rule requires that employers furnish the ALRB with
names and addresses of employees prior to the time a union
files a petition for an election." These lists of employees are
made available to the union by the Board. The ALRB has also
43.

The Board's access rule was upheld by the California Supreme Court in Ag-

ricultural Labor Relations Bd. v. Superior Court, 16 Cal. 3d 392, 546 P.2d 687, 128
Cal. Rptr. 183 (1976). For more detailed discussion of the two Board's differences in
focus, see M. Kennedy, The Choice of a Collective Bargaining Representative (197980) (unpublished master's thesis in Havard Law School Library).
44.

8 CAL. ADM. CODE § 20910 (1979) (pre-petition employee lists).
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developed a program to inform workers and growers of their
rights and obligations. Upon the filing of an election petition,
the Board may explain the election process to workers. It is
interesting to observe that the ALRB, in contrast to the
NLRB, appears to be using its rule-making power to establish
certain standards rather than making determinations on a
case by case basis.
The ALRB and NLRB also appear to vary somewhat in
the thrust of remedies. Both, of course, seek to correct the
violations found; but some ALRB remedies appear to be ordered in a particular case for their future deterrent value as,
for example, where the employer violator must afford increased access to employees on his property, or must furnish
lists of employees to the union at more frequent intervals, or
when the union exceeds its access privileges. "5
The divergent focus of the two agencies is cited not to
establish that one is right and the other wrong, but merely to
suggest that both approaches should be carefully analyzed
when new legislation is being considered in order to determine
which might serve best in agricultural labor relations. In considering new federal legislation it will be important to consider and evaluate all that has happened under the ALRA. In
this way, the drafters of the new legislation can incorporate
provisions which appear most desirable and correct any deficiencies which may have come to light during the implementation of the statute.
In general, the ALRA presents the best state legislative
model to study, because it was designed to deal specifically
with agricultural labor relations and is comprehensive in its
coverage. As with federal labor legislation, the ALRA was the
result of compromise between the parties affected. No one
party got all the provisions it wanted included in the law. The
ALRA has dealt effectively with the problems it was enacted
to address and has survived despite numerous obstacles. Immediately following the law's enactment, the ALRB was inundated with election petitions. This created problems because
of the newness of the law, the lack of fully trained personnel,
and the speed required by the statute to process these petitions. Within six months of its enactment, the legislature de45. See Ranch No. 1, 5 A.L.R.B. No. 1 (1979); 8 CAL. ADM. CODE, § 20900 (1979)
(solicitation by non-employee organizers on employer's premises).
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nied funding for the agency, thereby forcing it to suspend operations and making it difficult to recruit staff knowledgeable
in labor relations. The legislature has also, as indicated, attempted to amend many of the ALRA's innovations even
before a case had arisen which might give the ALRB an opportunity to interpret the statute and apply it. Legislative
committees at the same time continually investigated the operation of the ALRB. Gubernatorial appointments in the early
years seemed more calculated to appease labor and management interests than to supply persons well grounded in labor
relations and capable of fully developing the statutory framework already enacted. Later, when appointments were made
of persons knowledgeable in the labor relations area, the Senate refused for political reasons to confirm such appointments.
During the initial years both parties, management and labor,
attacked appointees and other ALRB personnel for alleged
bias. Employers appear to have organized recently chiefly to
resist the continued implementation of the new law. Despite
these difficulties, the ALRA has endured without significant
change, and as a statute is still capable of creating the proper
atmosphere for the development of sound agricultural labor
relations.
IV.

OTHER STATE LAWS

In addition to California, three other states, Arizona,
Idaho and Kansas, have enacted specific legislation regulating
agricultural labor relations." These states' statutes contain
provisions demonstrating particular policy determinations
made with respect to farmworkers. It is fair to say that these
statutes when compared with the NLRA or the California
ALRA would be considered much more restrictive of farmworkers' rights. 47 It is interesting to note that none of these
statutes in existence since 1972 appear to have stimulated organizational activity, resulted in many representation elections, or produced many decisions by their boards concerning
46.

Arizona, Idaho and Kansas adopted laws in 1972. ARMz. REv. STAT.

ANN.

§ 23-1381-95 (Supp. Pamph. 1976-1980); IDAHO CODE § 22-4101-13; KAN. STAT. ANN.

§

44-818-30 (1973). Hawaii and Wisconsin include agriculture in their general labor

laws by failing to specifically exclude agriculture from coverage. HAWAII REv. STAT.
§ 377-1(1) (1976); Wis. STAT. § 111.02(3) (1974).
47. See Moberly, Collective Bargaining Laws and Agricultural Employees:
Some Necessary Changes, 1 U. ILL. L. F. 469 (1976).
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agricultural labor relations."8 When compared with the California law passed in 1975, the activities generated by these
other state laws appear to be minuscule.4 ' This lends substance to the feeling of some commentators that these state
statutes were hastily developed by pro-employer interests to
thwart the passage of more comprehensive and balanced legislation encouraging formation of unions and collective
bargaining.
Perhaps one reason why these statutes have had an insubstantial impact on agricultural labor relations is because
the limiting features of some of their provisions do little to
stimulate collective bargaining and the development of a balanced labor relations law. For example, the Kansas statute is
a "meet and confer" type statute rather than legislation which
requires collective bargaining, and limits the topics upon
which the parties must meet for discussion. 50 Similarly, the
scope of bargaining under the Arizona statute is restricted by
an "employer rights" clause. Idaho removes from the scope of
bargaining any negotiations on subcontracting. 1
The statutes also restrict the coverage of the legislation
by their definitions of "employer" and by their procedures for
establishing units and conducting elections. Thus, the Kansas
law covers employers who employ six or more employees for
twenty or more days of any calendar month in the six months
preceding the filing for recognition by such employees.52 Arizona includes those employers who employed six or more agricultural employees for a period of thirty days during the preceding six month period.5 8 In general, the longer election
48.

An attack on the constitutionality of the Arizona statute has resulted in a

recent decision by the United States Supreme Court. Babbitt v. United Farmworkers
Nat'l Union, 442 U.S. 289 (1979), rejected some of the constitutional issues and remanded other issues for further consideration by the Arizona state courts. See also
Cohen & Rose, State Regulation of Agricultural Labor Relations-The Arizona
Farm Labor Law-An Interpretative and Comparative Analysis, 1973 LAW AND Soc.
ORDER 313 (1973); Rose, State Regulation of AgriculturalLabor Relations-The Arizona Farm Labor Law-A Constitutional Analysis, 1973 LAW AND SOC. ORDER 373
(1973); Fuller, Farm Labor Relations, 8 IDAHO L. REV. 66 (1971).
49. See ARIZONA AGRICULTURAL EMPLOYMENT REL. BD. ANN. REP. (1972-73).
This four and one-half page report indicates that the statute did little to stimulate
agricultural labor relations.

50. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 44-819(h), (1973).
51. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 23-1384 (Supp. Pamph. 1971-1980); IDAHO
22-4105 (1977).
52. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 44-819(c) (1973).

53.

ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN.

§ 23-1382(2) (Supp. Pamph. 1971-1980).

CODE

§
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process of all three statutes as compared to the California legislation would appear to curtail or eliminate seasonal employees from becoming part of the unit or prevent them from being in a unit with full time employees.
Neither the NLRA or the ALRA restrict strike activity of
the employee. On the other hand, based on a theory that work
stoppages in agriculture could seriously interrupt food production and distribution, Arizona and Kansas have limited
the right to strike. Arizona makes it an unfair labor practice
to call a strike unless a majority of the employees in the bar54
gaining unit have first approved the strike by a secret ballot.
Kansas also makes striking an unfair labor practice. Its statute appears to seek resolution of impasse by requiring mediation, fact finding, and binding arbitration. 55
Overall these statutes cannot serve as meaningful models
for national legislation, but some of their limiting provisions
do highlight areas where opposition might well attempt to dilute any proposed national legislation.
Other states, although having some labor laws applicable
to farmworkers, do not have any exclusive and comprehensive
act for agricultural labor relations. States vary with respect to
the existence of general laws affecting farmworkers. Subjects
which may or may not be covered include minimum wage,
hours, collection of wages, child labor, working conditions, labor contractors, collective bargaining, workers' compensation,
7
unemployment insurance, 56 transportation, and housing.
Of the five leading states in terms of number of hired
farmworkers in that state, only one, California, has a comprehensive agricultural law; the others, Texas, North Carolina,
Florida and Wisconsin, cannot be expected to enact one in the
near future. The farmworkers in those states will have no
meaningful coverage unless federal legislation is enacted."
54. Id. § 23-1385.
55. KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 44-826(c)(d), 44-828(c)(7) (1973).
56. A minority of states provide workers' compensation or unemployment insurance for farmworkers. See Exclusion of Farmworkers from Workers' Compensation
Coverage: Analysis Indicates No Rational Basis, 11 CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 719 (1977).
57. For survey of state legislation, see STAFF OF SUBCOMM. ON AGRICULTURAL LABOR OF COMM. ON EDUC. AND LABOR, 94TH CONG., 2D SEss., FEDERAL AND STATE STATUTES RELATING TO FARMWORKERS (Comm. Print 1976).
58. For a listing of the average number of hired farmworkers in each state, see
Farm Labor, U.S. DEPT. OF AGRICULTURE, PUBLISHED ECONOMIC STATISTICS AND COOPERATIVE SERVICE,

(Feb. 22, 1979).
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LEGISLATION AND PROGRAMS AFFECTING FARMWORKERS

As mentioned previously, another reason for the passage
of federal legislation providing collective bargaining for
farmworkers would be to enable employees' bargaining representatives to help enforce the numerous existing statutes and
programs which are applicable to farmworkers. Such statutes
are not always fully enforced. Others provide only limited
coverage of farmworkers compared with industrial workers. A
brief look at some federal laws and programs applicable to
farmworkers will create for the reader some awareness of the
types of federal legislation now existing which can affect
farmworkers' lives. No attempt is made to discuss fully the
scope of these laws, nor to describe the shortcomings of their
current application to farmworkers. Footnote citations to the
laws, however, will direct the reader to more detailed
discussions."
The Farm Labor Contractor Registration Act 0 requires
labor contractors to obtain a certificate of registration from
the Secretary of Labor. Contractors must show evidence of insurance or proof of financial responsibility. Prior to transporting migrant farmworkers, contractors must show compliance
with the rules and regulations of the Interstate Commerce
Commission. In addition to revocation of registration, criminal and civil penalties are provided. The act was amended in
1974 to extend coverage and strengthen enforcement. 1
When the Fair Labor Standards Act 2 was passed in 1938,
Approximately 2.7 million persons 14 years of age and over worked on farms for
wages and salaries at some time in 1977. The annual earnings of all hired
farmworkers averaged $3,265. Approximately 191,000 persons were migrants in 1977.
See Rowe, ECON. DEV. Div., ECONOMIC STATISTICS AND COOPERATIVE SERVICE, U.S.
DEP'T OF AGRICULTURE, The Hired Farm Working Force of 1977, Agricultural Econ.
Rep. No. 437 (1977).

59. See Morse, The Impact of Federal Legislation on Migrant Farm Workers,
12 SUFFOLK L. REV. 828 (1978); The Unionization of Farm Labor, 2 U. CAL. D. L.
REV. 1 (1970).
60. 7 U.S.C. §§ 2041-2055 (1976).
61. For testimony critical of the enforcement of this statute, see Administration
of Laws Affecting Farmworkers: Hearings of House Subcomm. on Manpower and
Housing of the House Comm. on Gov't. Operations, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 56 (1979).
See also Farm Labor Contractor Registration Act Amendments of 1976: Hearings
Before the Subcomm. on Agricultural Labor of the House Comm. on Educ. and Lab.,
94th Cong., 2d Sess. 97 (1976); Farm Labor Contractor Registration Act: Hearings
Before the Subcomm. on Economic Opportunity of the House Comm. on Educ. and
Lab., 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 127 (1978).
62. 29 U.S.C. §§ 201, 219 (1976). See Morse, supra note 59, at 828, 837-39, 855-
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it provided a minimum wage rate for most employees but expressly excluded farmworkers. Subsequent amendments to the
law in 1966 and 1974 extended coverage to farmworkers. The
limitation that wage rates apply only to employers who are
engaged in interstate commerce and who utilized 500 man
days of agricultural labor in any quarter of the preceding calendar year, however, excludes many farmworkers from coverage. The 1974 Amendments prohibited employment of children under twelve on farms covered by the Act's 500 man day
test.63 Overtime provisions do not apply to farms not meeting
the 500 man day test. Other provisions exempt specific kinds
of farmworkers."
The Wagner-Peyser Act 5 establishes the United States
Employment Service (now called U.S. Training and Employment Service) in the Department of Labor which, among
other responsibilities, maintains a farm placement service. By
regulations" standards relating to wages, housing, and transportation are set for the use of this service and to protect the
migrant worker. The Act provides for denial of federal funds
to state employment services not in compliance with federal
rules and regulations.
Sections 303 and 304 of Title 4967 provide for regulation
by the Department of Transportation (Federal Highway Administrator) of certain transportation of migrant farmworkers
in interstate and foreign commerce. Regulations issued" are
designed to protect workers in terms of safety, comfort standards, driver and inspection standards. The law includes provisions for investigation of complaints and the imposition of
fines.
57; Sherman, Farmworkers Amendments to the FairLabor Standards Act: A Guide
to Minimum Wage Practice and Procedure,5 CLEARINGHOUSE REv. 207 (1971); Fair
Labor Standards and Amendments of 1973: Hearings on H.R. 4757 and H.R. 2831
Before the Subcomm. on Labor of the House Comm. on Educ. and Lab., 93d Cong.,
1st Sess. 1, 7 (1974).
63. 29 U.S.C. §9 213(c)(1), 214 (1976).
64. 29 U.S.C. 99 213(a)(6), 213(b) (1976).
65. 29 U.S.C. § 49 (1976); See Morse, supra note 59, at 828, 835-36, 858-59;
NAACP v. Brennan, 360 F. Supp. 1006 (D.D.C. 1973). In this case the court held that
the Department of Labor had violated the Wagner-Peyser Act by funding state agencies which denied farmworkers the full range of services and failed to enforce protec-

tive legislation.
66.
67.
68.

See 20 C.F.R. §§ 602, 620 (1980).
49 U.S.C. §§ 303, 304 (1976).
See 49 C.F.R. §§ 398.1-398.8 (1979).

1981]

COLLECTIVE BARGAINING

The Occupational Safety and Health Act 9 empowers the
Secretary of Labor to promulgate safety and health standards
which apply to agriculture. Standards have been issued concerning sanitation in temporary labor camps, storage and handling of anhydrous ammonia, pulpwood logging, slow moving
vehicles, equipment safety and cotton dust.7 0 Civil and criminal penalties are provided 7 for violations of this statute.
Section 1182(a)(14) of the Immigration and Naturalization Act 7 2 provides that aliens seeking to enter the United
States for performing skilled or unskilled work are excluded
unless the Secretary of Labor certifies certain facts to the Department of Labor and the Attorney General. The purpose of
this law is to protect the wages and working conditions of U.S.
workers against competition from alien workers. The statute
provides for deportations and criminal penalties. 4
Federal Insurance Contributions Act (FICA)7 5 and Old
Age Survivors and Disability Insurance Act (OASDI)76 have
limited application to farmworkers.77 FICA imposes a tax on
wages to fund the old age survivors and disability insurance
program under the Social Security Act. As defined by FICA,
"wages" does not include noncash payments for agricultural
labor 7 8 nor does it include cash payments of less than $150
per year or payments for less than twenty days' work.7 9 Coverage by OASDI does not apply to persons whose wages are not
taxed under FICA.
69. 29 U.S.C. §§ 651-678 (1976). Standards for agricultural pesticides have been
the subject of bitter disputes among EPA, OSHA, farmworkers and pesticide industry. See Florida Peach Growers Ass'n v. United States Dep't of Labor, 489 F.2d 120
(5th Cir. 1974); OMICA v. Brennan, 520 F.2d 1161 (D.C. Cir. 1975); Comment,
Farmworkers in Jeopardy, OSHA, EPA and the Pesticide Hazard, 5 ECOLOGY L.Q.
69 (1975).
70. 29 C.F.R. §§ 1928.21, 1928.51, 1928.52, 1928.53, 1928.57 (1979).
71. 29 U.S.C. § 666(d), (e) (1976).
72. 8 U.S.C. §§ 1101-1503 (1976). For testimony critical of the Immigration Service and of aliens employed during the 1979 California strike, see FarmworkerCollective Bargaining:Hearings Before the Comm. on Labor and Human Resources, 96th
Cong., 1st Sess. 5 (1979). See also Morse, supra note 59, at 828, 840-43.
73. 8 U.S.C. § 1252 (Supp. II 1978).
74. 8 U.S.C. § 1324 (Supp. II 1978).
75. 26 U.S.C. §§ 3101-3126 (1976).
76. 42 U.S.C. §§ 401-432 (1976).
77. Morse, supra note 59, at 828, 836-37 (1978).
78. 26 U.S.C: § 3121(a)(8)(A) (1976).
79. 26 U.S.C. § 3121(a)(8)(B) (1976).
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The Sugar Act of 194880 is of historical interest only at
this time, since the law expired and the 96th Congress in 1979
voted down its reenactment. The Act provided that growers
would receive allotment payments provided they made certain
minimum wage payments to farmworkers.
There are also numerous federal programs enacted as
part of a more comprehensive law which affects farmworkers.
For example, the Special Health Revenue Sharing Act of
197581 provides aid to migrant farmworkers' health centers;8 '
the Hospital and Medical Facilities Amendments of 196488
gives funds to states for the construction of public and nonprofit hospitals. Hospitals receiving funds are required to furnish services to persons unable to pay. The Rehabilitation Act
of 197384 provides grants to states to pay for the cost of vocational rehabilitation of handicapped migratory agricultural
workers. The Food Stamp Act of 1974 applies to low income
persons including farmworkers. 85 The Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 196588 allows grants to states to meet
8 7
the educational needs of children of migratory farmworkers.
Farmworkers are also affected by the Migrant Head Start
Program and Comprehensive Employment and Training Act
as well as the work of the Community Services Administration
and Volunteers in Service to America (VISTA).
Farmworkers are specifically excluded from some federal
statutes. For example, as mentioned earlier, the National Labor Relations Act,88 in its definition of "employee" excludes
the agricultural worker and hence the applicability of this Act
to agriculture. The Internal Revenue Code provides for income tax withholding by employers from wages, but wages are
80. Ch. 519, § 1, 61 Stat. 922 (1947) (codified at 7 U.S.C. §§ 1101-1183 (1970)
(expired 1974)). See Morse, supra note 59, at 828, 856-67.
81. Pub. L. No. 94-63, § 401, 89 Stat. 304 (1975); see S. REP. No. 94-29, 94th
Cong., 1st Sess. 38-39 (1975).
82. 42 U.S.C. § 247(d) (1976).
83. Pub. L. No. 88-443, § 603, 78 Stat. 447 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 291 (1976)).

84.

Pub. L. No. 93-112, § 2, 87 Stat. 357 (codified at 29 U.S.C. §§ 701-794

(1976)).
85. 7 U.S.C. §§ 2011-2025 (1976). See Scher, Catz & Mathews, USDA: Agriculture at the Expense of Small Farmers and Farmworkers, 7 U. TOL. L. REv. 837, 85760 (1976).
86. 20 U.S.C. § 241(a) (1976).
87. Morse, supra note 59, at 828, 849-50.
88. 29 U.S.C. §§ 141-187 (1976).
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defined to exclude monies paid for agricultural labor.89 The
Tax Reduction Act of 197590 excludes migrant farm workers
from the definition of "eligible employee" for the purpose of
computing federal welfare recipient employment incentive tax
credit.
A passing observation should be made concerning federal
legislation or programs which in general provide social or protective benefits for American workers. Congress appears to
have acted belatedly in making many social benefits applicable specifically to farmworkers, and when it did act concerning farmworkers, limitations were placed on the laws designed
to give farmworkers what others have had for many years.
Furthermore, it would be fair to say that agencies given responsibility for the enforcement of the legislation have been
less than zealous in seeing that farmworkers receive the maximum benefits from these laws. One would hope that employee
representatives created by federal collective bargaining legislation would press for increased enforcement of these benefits.
VI.

AGRICULTURAL LABOR UNIONS

It can be anticipated that with national legislation similar
to the NLRA to promote representation of employees and collective bargaining, unions will evolve as they have in the private and public sector to meet the special needs of their constituents. It is understandable that in the absence of collective
bargaining laws, either federal or state, there is currently a
paucity of strong, financially secure agricultural unions. However, the present existence of agricultural unions is irrelevant
to the question of whether there should be a federal law to
provide collective bargaining for farmworkers. There are good
reasons for such laws, and these reasons should be determining factors in promoting the enactment of federal legislation.
Probably the best known of the current organizations
representing farmworkers is the United Farmworkers (UFW)
headed by Caesar Chavez in California. This organization
both before and after the passage of the California ALRA has
vied with the Teamsters to represent farmworkers. Since the
UFW has more contracts than the Teamsters and both organizations have reached an agreement ending their competition
89.
90.

26 U.S.C. § 3401(a)(2) (1976).
26 U.S.C. § 1 (1976).
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for agricultural workers under the jurisdiction of the ALRB,
UFW will probably be the dominant union on the California
agricultural scene.91
There are organizations representing or seeking to represent farmworkers in other states, but the organizations
have not achieved the success of the UFW in California, no
doubt because of the lack of meaningful state legislation. In
Arizona there is the Arizona Farmworkers as well as the
UFW. In Florida there is the UFW, the Arizona Farmworkers,
the United Migrant Association and the United Migrants. In
Texas there is both the UFW and the Texas Farm Workers.
In Ohio and Indiana the Farm Labor Organizing Committee
has been active, while in New Jersey the Association de
Trabajadores Agricolas de Puerto Rico has done some organizing but may be dormant at the present time.
VII.

CONCLUSION

As mentioned before, the question of whether it might be
politically feasible to enact federal legislation for farmworkers
is an issue distinct from the necessity for such legislation.
Congress has not been receptive to passing labor legislation in
the past, and this particular proposed law would generate a
great deal of vocal opposition. Opponents would surely argue
that unionization of farmworkers would result in high food
costs and, although this argument could be refuted, it could
be used to rally consumers in opposition during this inflationary period.
Then too, this is not a publicized period of crisis for
farmworkers as it was during the lettuce boycott and times of
turmoil during the sixties and early seventies. Not that the
farmworkers' problems have been solved, but the question of
national legislation is not a current burning issue. It might be
difficult to arouse those who would traditionally support such
legislation.
With respect to the parties who would be affected by the
legislation-growers and farmworkers-support or opposition
would depend upon the specifics of the legislation. Growers in
general would probably still prefer no regulation. Only if it
appeared that legislation was inevitable would they opt for
91. For a more detailed explanation, see Rochin, New Perspectives on Agricultural Labor Relations in California, 28 LAB. L. J. 395, 399-400 (1977).
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the simple amendment of the NLRA rather than more extensive legislation specifically directed at agriculture. [It is perhaps somewhat misleading to talk about farmers as if they
represented a monolith with common ideas and goals. There
is much diversity depending on type of farming and location.
Farmers in different areas could well have varying views.]
Some opposition by farmers who own small farms might be
diffused if care was taken in drafting legislation to exclude
such farms. Most commentators agree that such exclusion
would not be detrimental to the general goals of a national
agricultural labor relations law.
Support for the NLRA amendment by such unions as the
UFW in California cannot be guaranteed. The UFW has already expressed its feeling that it would oppose a federal law
which would preempt state law and might result in giving
them less than they now have under the California ALRA.
Perhaps the UFW could be convinced that some compromise
regarding a federal law would serve the interests of all those
farmworkers who have no coverage at this time. This is not to
suggest that the California ALRA be stripped of all its innovative features to serve as a model for a new federal law. The
intent is rather to urge that the UFW give serious thought to
the benefits a national law would have for all farmworkers and
that it consider what compromise is possible and reasonable.
Compromise between the parties, as mentioned earlier, has always been a crucial element in achieving the enactment of labor legislation. Should the UFW actively oppose the idea of
national legislation, their opposition would surely undermine
support for the passage of such legislation.
There is a need for national legislation to provide collective bargaining for farmworkers. Ideally, the legislation should
vest the NLRB with jurisdiction and contain provisions directly related to the problems of agricultural labor relations.
Whether this ideal can be achieved is still uncertain, but the
hope is that those in Congress who understand the benefits of
such legislation will try again as soon as politically feasible to
make the ideal a reality.

